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This paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of three nominal risk factors, local 
interest spreads, US interest spread, and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio on the 
value of firms and on the cross-listing decision of firms destined to three major markets in 
North America, Asia and Europe. We use firm-level data in 29 countries of cross-listing 
origin over a six year period, from 2000 to 2005. We find consistent and robust evidence 
that the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio risk factor in the Sharpe sense provides 
an important benchmark for firm value across the universe of publicly traded companies; 
and this effect is larger for smaller firms that cross-list abroad. Countries in Asia, Europe 
and South America tend to seek more funds abroad through cross-listing relative to other 
regions in this sample. In general, we find that the lagged local interest risk factor is 
positively related to current probability of cross listing. Small firms located in Asia, 
medium firms located in Europe, and large firms located in Asia, Europe and South 
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Open international capital markets have been instrumental in efficiently allocating risk and 
allowing firms to fulfill their capital investment demand. Also, nominal risk factors may 
affect business investment through multiple channels. First, changes in market interest rates 
imply changes in the cost of capital, which in turn affect investment; the so-called interest 
channel. Second, changes in market interest rates affect the net cash flow available to a firm. 
Given imperfect capital markets, the availability of net cash flow will have an effect on 
investment. This is generally referred to as the broad credit channel. However, many other 
linkages exist between monetary factors and real investment. Interest rate levels, risk factors 
such as banking spreads and monetary policy signal-to-noise ratios, contagion, leverage and 
liquidity effects are closely related to monetary policy activity and variability and those 
factors can affect real investment. 
In terms of publicly traded companies, real investment funds are not bounded by 
local stock markets but also include the possibility of firms seeking funds abroad by cross-
listing in foreign stock exchanges. In this paper, we use firm-level data in 29 countries of 
cross-listing origin over a six year period, from 2000 to 2005 to study the effects of nominal 
variables on firm value and the firm’s decision to cross-list abroad.
1 The evidence in this 
paper is based on firms cross-listed in a major North-American, Asian and European market. 
Table 1 shows top exchanges by total share trading value where the U.S. markets in 2006 
ranked first and second.
2 
This paper explores an empirical mechanism of monetary policy on the value of 
firms and thus real investment through interest rate channels. We consider nominal interest 
rate level effects, monetary growth effects and risk measures of monetary policy such as 
                                                 
1 Several studies have examined the influence of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. stock prices. First, 
Modigliani and Cohn (1979) discuss the hypothesis that investors irrationally discount real cash flows 
using nominal interest rates implying that stock markets will be undervalued during periods of high 
expected inflation and overvalued during periods of low expected inflation. More recently, Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2004) show that cyclical, capital-intensive industrial sectors and financially-
constrained firms react more strongly to U.S. monetary policy. Bernanke, Kuttner (2005) show that U.S. 
monetary policy shocks affect domestic stock markets mainly through their effects on risk premiums. 
Wongswan (2006) finds that global equity indexes mainly react to the Fed’s target rate surprises rather 
than path surprises.  
 
2 However, from 2005 to 2006, the US was unable to raise as much investment capital as other markets, 






banking spreads and signal-to-noise ratio of interest rates. There is also literature that 
examines the premium in market value of firms that cross list abroad. In particular, Doidge 
et al (2004, 2009) provide evidence that cross-listing in the United States stock exchange 
provides a significant premium in firm’s market value; see also Bianconi and Tan (2010). 
They attribute that premium to higher standards of corporate governance in the US. This 
evidence led us to seek measures of US monetary policy and risk factors as benchmarks for 
for the valuation of publicly traded firms around the world, and potential more important 
factors for firms that cross-list in the US. Hence, in addition to local measures of interest 
rates, monetary growth and spreads, we also include U.S. monetary policy measures of 
spread and signal-to-noise ratio in interest rates as a benchmark. We find consistent and 
robust empirical evidence that the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (in the Sharpe 
sense) risk factor provides an important benchmark for firm value across the universe of 
publicly traded companies. 
Our main question is whether or not three risk factors, the local interest rate 
spread, the U.S. interest spread and the U.S. federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio 
influence the valuation of firms worldwide firm value and whether or not they influence the 
decision of firms to cross-list abroad for our sample of 29 countries in the 2000-2005 period. 
First, we found that measures of contemporaneous and lagged local interest rate levels are 
irrelevant in the presence of measure of US interest rate levels; in particular the current and 
lagged US federal funds rate. However, when we add measures of local interest rate spreads 
and U.S. interest spread and U.S. federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio; the level effects of 
US nominal interest rate on firm value become irrelevant. When the US lowers the current 
(and lagged) federal funds rate relative to its volatility (or when the signal-to-noise ratio in 
the U.S. federal funds rate is higher or the market price of interest rate risk is lower in the 
Sharpe sense) the market value of all firms increases in the cross-country balanced panel. A 
potential transmission mechanism could be through relative risks. A higher local interest 
rate spread relative to the lower U.S. spread and signal-to-noise ratio could capture more 
risk in the source country capital market relative to the U.S. A local firm cross listing 
abroad makes arbitrage of relative risks in these markets. Moreover, an increase in the 





refers roughly to a US credit boom cycle. In times of a credit crunch, the effect should be 
reversed; see e.g. Lucas (1990), Haslag and Young (1998), He and Krishmurthy (2008). 
More recently, Taylor and Williams (2009) examine the recent increase in U.S. 
interest rate spreads between overnight federal funds and longer term interbank loans 
caused by counterparty risk, liquidity, leverage and others. They find that increased 
counterparty risk contributed to the rise in U.S. spreads, but their evidence is that U.S. 
monetary intervention had no significant effect on mitigating the rise on spreads. We take 
this as evidence of the importance of interest rate risk as measured by spreads and signal-to-
noise ratios have become a more important potential factor in understanding non-
neutralities of money; see IMF (2009).
3  
We also present results of the effect of the three interest risk factors by 
destination of cross-listing, by firm size and on the firm decision to cross-list. The US fed 
funds risk factor is significant for all three cross-listing destinations, US, Hong Kong and 
Germany. There is a positive premium for the US and Germany, but a discount for firms 
listed in Hong Kong.
4 From a perspective of size, our main finding here is that smaller firms, 
and larger firms to a lower order of magnitude, tend to be more sensitive to the US fed 
funds rate risk factor and the ones that are cross-listed are even more sensitive to the US fed 
funds risk benchmark. 
Our evidence on the determinants of cross listing from treatment effects shows 
geography and proximity play a significant role. Countries in Asia, Europe and South 
America tend to seek more funds abroad through cross-listing relative to other regions in 
this sample. Also, we find evidence that countries that cross list tend to be more sensitive to 
the US fed funds risk factor. The evidence from the destination samples is that geography 
has a positive and robust effect on the probability of cross listing for all destinations. The 
Hong Kong destination sample shows a robust risk arbitrage effect on the probability of 
cross listing abroad. Countries that cross list in the US tend to be more sensitive to the US 
fed funds risk factor. The treatment evidence by size identifies more significantly effects of 
                                                 
3 See also He and Krishmurthy (2008, 2009) and DeMarzo et al (2009) on issues relating to spreads, 
risk and the value of firms. 
 
4 We have no knowledge of other papers in the literature that examine cross listing effects for Hing 
Kong and Germany destinations. The Hong Kong destination is predominantly from firms from China, 
while the Germany destination if predominantly from Europe, but varies more broadly. Hence, 





lagged local interest spreads on the probability of cross listing across all sizes. Our finding 
is that, in general, if local spreads were lower in the past, the probability of seeking cross-
listing in the current period is low. The geography effects remain positive and robust for all 
sizes and methods. Small firms located in Asia show a higher probability of cross listing 
abroad, while medium firms located in Europe show a higher relative probability of cross 
listing abroad. Large firms in Asia, Europe and South America show a higher relative 
probability of cross listing abroad. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some 
basic theoretical models of relevance. Section 3 reviews institutional arrangements of cross-
listing in the U.S., Hong Kong, and Germany. Section 4 describes the data while section 5 
presents the main empirical results. The last section offers concluding remarks.   
 
2. Models 
Tobin’s (1969) portfolio choice model of the effects of money on real returns emphasized 
the wealth effect of monetary policy on asset prices. When the nominal money stock 
increases and/or the nominal interest rate decreases, asset prices increase and firm’s q 
increase thus leading to an increase in the demand for real capital. The real effect occurs 
through a portfolio channel since money yields zero return and an increase in money 
increases the demand for other real assets thus decreasing real interest rates. However, this 
is the demand side effect. There is a capital supply effect in which lower real interest rates 
dampen asset yields, and thus the initial asset prices and firm value increases are dampened 
as well. Hence, from the supply side perspective, nominal interest rates and firm value 
should be positively correlated.
5 Another channel is the nominal interest rate effect on bank 
interest rates spread due to inflation tax on bank reserves, e.g. Haslag and Young (1998) and 
also Dotsey and Ireland (1998). In particular, the effect of nominal interest rate on Tobin’s q 
is that nominal interest rate spreads contain information about inflation. In particular, higher 
inflation implies higher spreads. As a consequence, higher spreads can discourage financial 
intermediation and lower investment thus affecting firm’s market value. The effect of 
inflation on spreads is discussed in Lucas (2000), Haslag and Young (1998), Yoshino 
                                                 
5 We may also justify the real effects of money via financial frictions or market imperfections; e.g. 






(1993). One of the main transmission mechanisms for the non-neutrality of money is 
through interest spreads, see IMF (2009). 
     More recently, the risk premium channel has been emphasized. An increase in the 
risk premium can lower investment and affect firm’s market value, e.g. He and Krishmurthy 
(2008), He (2009), Wongswan (2006), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). There are several 
sources of increases in banking spreads in the asset pricing literature including bank costs, 
bank reserves, tax profits, counterpart risk, liquidity, leverage and asset risk among others. 
In effect, banking spreads may have higher information content than nominal interest rate 
levels per se. An ideal monetary policy would be one in which there is no noise, only valid 
price signals. The best possible monetary policy would maximize the signal-to-noise ratio. 
In summary, monetary policy can be characterized not only by nominal interest rate levels, 
but also by the risk premium component in the bank interest spread and interest rate signal-
to-noise ratio.  
    In the realm of publicly traded companies, the top exchanges are in the U.S., see 
Table 1; and the U.S. is the largest economy in the world. Hence, U.S. monetary policy can 
have an impact on firm value that goes beyond its own borders, not only due to trade 
interactions but also due to foreign firms demand for capital in the large stock exchanges 
through ADRs, over the counter trade, cross listing and other mechanisms. In particular, 
U.S. interest rate policy can generate fluctuations in the value of firms and in the demand 
for funds in foreign exchange markets through these channels, see e.g. IMF (2009), Taylor 
and Williams (2009). Given the recent attention to spreads and risk premium, monetary 
policy can be characterized by the nominal federal funds rate and the market price of 
interest rate risk.
6 In Figure 1, we note the observed lower average U.S. federal funds rate as 
well as a lower average relative to its volatility in the 2000-2005 period, mainly after the 
September 11 event, which is consistent with lower expected inflation as well.  
The main hypothesis of this paper regards the local interest rate level, spread, risk 
and U.S. nominal monetary effects on firm value across countries. When the level of 
nominal interest rate increases; the domestic cost of funds increases and firms need to cross-
                                                 
6 See Kyotaki and Moore (1997, 2005) for credit cycles models, Fostel and Geneakoplos (2008) for 
leverage cycles models and Taylor and Williams (2009) on interest spreads and counterparty risk. Also, 
the vast literature on contagion effects emphasizes the international transmission of monetary policy, 






list abroad to fulfill the gap between effective and notional demands for investment. Thus, 
for those firms who seek to cross list abroad we observe an increase firm’s q, the so-called 
cross-listing premium, e.g. Doidge et al (2004); as well as a positive correlation between q 
and nominal interest rates. However, when we add measures of local interest spreads, 
market price of risk increase and U.S. spreads and market price of risk, the interest level 
effects are not identified. The risk effects are consistent with a predominant effect of U.S. 
monetary policy on Tobin’s q across countries. 
 Our empirical strategy is to estimate the monetary nominal effects on firm’s q in 
two ways. First, we measure the nominal monetary effects on the value of the firm directly, 
controlling for cross-listing. Second, we estimate the direct effect of nominal monetary 
effects on cross-listing as a treatment, and then the nominal monetary effects on firm’s q 
controlling for the cross-listing treatment. One of our main results is that there is 
benchmarking by publicly traded firms in US fed funds risk factor. 
 
3. A Brief Overview of International Cross-listings 
Firms’ tend to cross-list abroad for four common reasons.
7 Market segmentation allows 
investors to escape cross-border barriers to investment. Liquidity effects reduce costs in the 
sense that the greater liquidity the lower the spreads. The information or signaling 
hypothesis is based on the premise that cross-listing signals market participants about the 
financial health of the firm. Finally, the corporate governance hypothesis or "bonding" 
assumes that firms, whom domestically have poor governance standards, often list their 
securities on countries with more rigorous governance procedures.
8 
The US, Hong Kong and Germany are the three destination markets for cross-
listing focused in this study.
9 In the US, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) is the 
primary way for foreign firms to cross-list. It is a negotiable certificate that represents a 
                                                 
7 Karolyi (1998, 2005) conducted a thorough review of the cross-listing literature; see also Bianconi 
and Tan (2010). 
 
8 For the information hypothesis, see Cantale (1996), Fuerst (1998), Moel (1999), Baker, Nofsinger and 
Weaver (2002), Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) and Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2005). For the corporate 
governance hypothesis, see Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) 
and Doidge (2004). 
 
9 See Doidge et al (2004, 2009). Bianconi and Chen (2009) describe in details the institutional 





foreign company’s public traded equity. Depositary Receipts are made when brokers 
purchase a company’s shares on the respective domestic home stock market followed by 
delivering it to the depositary’s local custodian bank, such as Goldman Sachs, Union Bank 
of California, State Street, etc.  
In Hong Kong, the stock market is operated by the SEHK (Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong). The SEHK is a wholly owned subsidiary of the HK Exchange. Securities 
transactions on the SEHK are executed by the Automatic Order Matching and Execution 
System (AMS). The Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), launched by the SEHK, serves as a 
conduit where emerging enterprises, which do not fulfill the profitability or track record 
requirements of the existing market of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, can obtain a 
listing and increase capital. To cross-list in Hong Kong, firms can list either on the Main 
Board or with GEM.  
In Germany, firms can cross-list on either the EU-regulated market or the Open 
market. A listing on the Regulated Market leads to the General Standard or its Prime 
Standard segment, while admission to trading on the Regulated Unofficial Market leads to 
the Open Market with its Entry Standard segment.  
Generally speaking, the listing requirements for cross-listing in Hong Kong and 
Germany are less stringent than in the US. Another factor to consider are the listing costs. 
Entry fees for the U.S. are nearly three times the cost for listing in Germany, and nearly four 
times that of Hong Kong.
10 Finally, an important factor in the decision to cross-list is 
geography and proximity as discussed in Bianconi and Tan (2010). 
 
4. Data 
We start by defining firm’s q. It measures the valuation of firms, computed often as total 
value divided by total assets. In our analysis, following Doidge et al. (2004), we calculate q 
as follows: 




tion Capitaliza Market Liability Total
q

    (1) 
                                                 
 
10 See Santos and Scheinkman (2001) for a model of competition among exchanges; Froot and Dabora 






For firm i in year t, where the denominator is the firm’s book value of total assets and the 
numerator is the firm’s book value of total liability plus its market capitalization. Market 
capitalization is computed as the firm’s common shares outstanding multiplied by its 
current market price. We follow Hirsh and Seaks (1993) and use the logarithm of q in the 
empirical analysis. All financial information used above is obtained at the fiscal year-end 
from 1999 to 2004.
11  
    The sample firms’ financial information comes from the WorldScope database 
(July 2000 – July 2005). We focus on the origin countries of firms that were cross-listed in 
the U.S., Hong Kong, and Germany. Table 2 presents the 29 countries of origin of firms, 
their distribution across regions as well and cross-listing information and cross-listing by 
destination.
12   
We started with a data set over the six year period of 90,418 data points. Then, 
we excluded observations from the finance, insurance, and real estate industries by 
eliminating firms that have two-digit SIC code from 60 to 67. This is because the valuation 
ratios of financial institutions are usually not comparable to those of non-financial firms. 
We compiled the firms that were only listed on their domestic exchanges with 54,885 total 
firms. 
We obtained the firms cross-listed in the U.S. via the CompuStat World Database. 
After finding the names of the cross-listed firms, we then matched names with the 
WorldScope Database in order to compile the financial information. If the firm’s name or 
financial data was not available, then the firm was omitted. In order to maintain consistency, 
any new listing from a different foreign country over the six year period of time was 
omitted.  
                                                 
11 Due to data constraints, this measure does not use the market value of debt in the numerator and uses 
total assets instead of replacement cost in the denominator, see e.g. Doidge et al (2004, 2009). However, 
it does include total liability which is sensitive to leverage. 
 
12 Note that we do not include the UK destination because of its overlap with the US destination, see 
e.g. Doidge et al (2009) and Bianconi and Tan (2010). For example, this explains why Greece has 
many more firms in the sample than Ireland, since the latter cross lists more in the UK. We also do not 
include Canada because of its geographic proximity to the US. Firms that were domestically listed in 
the U.S., Hong Kong, and Germany; firms from U.S., Hong Kong, or Germany that were cross-listed 
elsewhere; firms cross-listed on other exchanges, but not the U.S., Hong Kong, or German exchanges; 
and firms from Canada, the Russian Federation, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and other small islands 





    The firms cross-listed in Hong Kong and Germany were found via the Hang Seng 
index website for Hong Kong and the Dusseldorf and Frankfort exchange websites (Xetra) 
for Germany. We included the Dusseldorf exchange as well because it is a private exchange 
that deals in private issues. Due to the fact that we also included private ADRs, we deemed 
it necessary to include the Dusseldorf exchange. Private listings cross-listed on the Hong 
Kong Exchange were also included. After finding the names, we again matched names with 
the WorldScope database in order to compile the financial information necessary. We 
followed La Porta et al (2002) and, to reduce the weight of outliers, maintained q at the 2
nd 
and 98
th percentiles by setting extreme values to the 2
nd and 98
th percentile values, 
respectively. We then eliminated twin firms, or firms that cross-listed in more than one of 
the three destination markets. At this point, we had an unbalanced panel data set with 
48,307 observations in the firm and time dimension.
13 Finally, we reduced the sample by 
considering each firm that had observations in all years. As a result, we obtained a balanced 
panel of 15,876 firms of which 781 are cross-listed. In this sample there are 2,646 firms per 
year over the six year period, in 2000, 177 were cross-listed, 160 in 2001, 126 in 2002, 120 
in 2003, 94 in 2004 and 104 in 2005. Table 2 presents further information of cross-listing by 
destination and by geographic region.
14     
Besides the dummy variables for cross-listing, we also include several firm-level, 
country-level and region variables as controls. We introduce 2-digit SIC code dummies to 
control for industry effects. Twenty and Hundred are dummy variables used to represent 
firm size based on asset amounts. A value of 1 was given if a firm that has more than $20 
million in total assets and $100 million respectively. The independent variable Sox is a time 
variable used to represent the occurrence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It is given a value of 0 
for all firms that are not cross-listed before 2002.
15 Region dummies for Asia, Africa, 
Europe, North America, South America and Oceania were included to control for 
geography and proximity effects. GDPG is the GDP growth rate of the firm’s source 
country differentiated by year, thus controlling for some macroeconomic factors. Data for 
                                                 
13 We first ran several models using the large unbalanced panel including local nominal interest rates 
and monetary growth data.  
  
14 We kept Brazil in the balanced panel sample even though the firm is not cross-listed; more cross-
listed firms were available in the large unbalanced panel for this country. 
   





the country-level variable GDP growth was obtained from the IMF website, the IMF world 
development indicator report.  
For each country, the source for interest rate spread data is the IFS - International 
Financial Statistics of the IMF. The local interest rate spread is the difference between the 
deposit rate and the money market rate. For the U.S., the interest rate data is from the 
Federal Reserve Board. The U.S. spread is the difference between the prime rate and the 
federal funds rate. The signal-to-noise ratio is the twelve month average federal funds rate 
divided by its standard deviation for that year. 
Table 3 present the definition of variables. Table 4 and 5 the summary statistics 
and the correlation matrix. First, we note that the average q in the sample is 1.71, the 
average local interest spread is -0.77 percentage points, the average US Prime-federal funds 
rate spread is 2.995 percentage points and the average US federal funds rate signal-to-noise 
ratio is 7.7. The standard deviation of the local spread is about 1.5%, for the US prime over 
fed funds rate is about 2 tenths of a percent, and 4.69 for the US fed funds risk. We also 
note in Table 5 that the unconditional correlation between log q and local interest spread is 
negative and about -15%, with the US prime-federal funds rate spread it is small and 
negative -4%, and with the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio an even smaller 
negative -1.5%. The unconditional correlation between cross-listing and local interest 
spread is small and negative, about -3.2%; with the US prime-federal funds rate spread 
small and positive 2.7%, and with the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio it is 
positive and small 3%.  
The top part of Figure 1 shows a graph of the US federal funds rate annual 
average, its volatility and the signal-to-noise ratio (US federal funds rate annual average 
divided by its volatility); and the lower part shows the US prime rate, federal funds rate 
spread by year. The US fed funds rate level declines until 2004 and the volatility peaks in 
2001, due to September 11, but remains mostly stable afterwards. As noted, the signal-to-
noise ratio declines from a peak in 2000; and the prime-fed funds rate spread declines as 
well. The variability of the US prime-fed funds spread is very small while the fed funds rate 
signal-to-noise ratio has more variability, from a peak of over 16 in 2000 to about 5 in 2005. 
Figure 2 shows a graph of firm value q and the local interest spread by country. Argentina, 





Hungary and Portugal in Europe all have lower and less disperse firm q value. Japan, 
Singapore and Israel in Asia; South Africa in Africa;  Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, CH and the UK in Europe, Brazil in 
South America; Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania all 
have higher and more disperse firm q value in this period. The variability of the local spread 
is relatively large in Argentina, Finland, Mexico and Venezuela. Figure 3 shows predicted q 
conditional on the interest spreads and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio for the 
cross listed and non cross-listed samples. The cross-listed sample does predict a higher firm 
value as is well documented in the literature. Finally, Figure 4 shows a graph of the 
probability of cross-listing conditional on the three risk factors, the local interest spread, the 
US prime spread and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio. Note that the year labels 
indicate that the predicted probabilities of cross-listing were higher in the early years and 
lower towards later years in the sample, particularly 2005. 
 
5. Econometric Models and Empirical Results    
Our empirical models ultimately identify nominal risk factors on firm value. We have a 
balanced dynamic panel where each firm is counted only in one country of origin each year.  
First, we ran several models using the large unbalanced panel (48,307 
observations) including local nominal interest rate levels and monetary growth data. We 
found that local nominal interest rates have a positive contemporaneous effect on firm value 
with evidence in favor of a positive relationship between firm value and the local nominal 
interest rate. This is consistent with the supply side effect that higher nominal interest rates 
can lead to higher real interest rates and higher capital supply via firm’s market valuation.
16 
However, when adding measures of local spreads and US federal funds spread and signal-
to-noise ratio, the level effects become irrelevant. We proceeded using the balanced panel 
                                                 
16 This is along the lines of Tobin (1969) general equilibrium effects of monetary policy. See also 
Javier, Lopez-Salido, Nelson (2004) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), and Bolton, Chen, and Wang 
(2009) for a recent unified theory of nominal and real effects. Bond et al (2004) examine the effect of 
expected profit on firm value. We also found that smaller firms are more sensitive to the 
contemporaneous positive interest rate effect, whereas larger firms have negative lagged interest rate 
effects. Smaller firms are more sensitive to the positive contemporaneous money growth effects when 
deciding to cross list; but, larger firms have negative contemporaneous and negative lagged money 
growth effects; these results are comparable to Chatelain, et al (2001) for a sample for the Euro zone. 






(15,876 observations) to measure the effects of local spreads and US federal funds spread 
and signal-to-noise ratio on firm value controlling for cross-listing. We separate the sample 
based upon cross-listing destination; and later consider sub-samples by firm size according 
to total assets. We then measure effects of local spreads and US federal funds spread and 
US fed funds signal-to-noise ratio on the decision to cross list and the effects on firm value, 
also considering destination and firm size. 
5.1 Panel and Dynamic Panel Regressions 
We apply two basic methods, panel fixed effects, and the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
dynamic panel methodology. The panel fixed effects model is given by 
 log  qit = β0 +  β3 dep_mktct + β4 dep_mktct-1 + β5 prime_fedUS, t-1 + β6 fed_mcvUS, t +  
β7 fed_mcvUS, t-1 + β8 Cross-Listit + β' Xitc + at+ εit     (2) 
and the dynamic panel is given by 
log qit = β0 + β1 log qit-1 + β2 log qit-2 + β3 dep_mktct + β4 dep_mktct-1 + β5 prime_fedUS, t-1 +  
β6 fed_mcvUS, t + β7 fed_mcvUS, t-1 + β8 Cross-Listit + β' Xitc + at+ εit     (3) 
where i indexes the company and t indexes the year and c indexes the country. Xitc is a 
vector of controls which includes Sarbanes-Oxley, geographic region, SIC industry code 
dummies, growth of gdp, firm size, country and time trend effects, and interactions. The 
main hypotheses refer to the signs and magnitudes of the β3 ,…, β8  The variable GDPG is 
used to control for country macroeconomic factors. Size refers to the variables Twenty and 
Hundred, used to control for firm size and thus try to capture growth opportunity of the firm. 
Specification (2)-(3) refers to overall effects on valuation, and we also condition on cross-
listing destination. We also use the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimation 
since we have a small number of years and a large number of firms. The results for 
specifications (2)-(3) are shown in Tables 6.
17 
Table 6, columns 1 and 2 refers to the relationship between nominal risk factors 
and firm value for the general panel. The regressions include all controls and interaction 
terms. The first main result is that the current and lagged US federal funds rate signal-to-
noise ratio (in the Sharpe sense) have a significant negative effect on firm value across 
countries, while the (current and lagged) local spread and the (lagged) US prime rate-federal 
                                                 
17 The method is based on GMM with first differences, and fixed effects are appropriately taken into 
account. The standard errors are adjusted for clusters in the panel regressions and the time dimension 





funds rate spread are not significant. There is robust evidence that US fed funds risk 
benchmarking is occurring during this period. A decrease of one unit in the 
contemporaneous average US federal funds rate relative to its volatility increases the value 
of firm on average by 2.65%, say from q=1 to q=1.0265 both in the panel and dynamic 
panel models, columns (1) and (2), and this effects are almost similar for the lagged US fed 
funds risk factor indicating persistent and cumulative effects. Secondly, the cross-listing 
premium is significant and well identified, when controlling for the monetary risk factors, 
interactions and all other controls. The magnitudes are much larger as expected; about 
15.3% in the panel fixed effects model and 28.2% in the dynamic panel model.
18  
Columns 3-8 present results conditional on cross-listing in one of the three 
destinations: US, Hong-Kong and Germany; thus capturing North America, Asia and 
Europe destination effects. The main identification results of columns (1) and (2) continue 
to hold. In the US destination, columns (3) and (4), the US fed funds risk benchmarking and 
the cross-listing premium effects are very similar to the overall sample. In addition, the 
(lagged) US prime rate-federal funds rate spread in the US destination is significant, a one 
tenth of a percent (one standard deviation) decline in the (lagged) US prime rate-federal 
funds rate spread, increases the value of firms in the US destination by 7.9%.  
The destinations of Hong Kong and Germany follow.
19 In the Hong Kong 
destination, the US fed funds risk benchmarking is occurring significantly with magnitudes 
similar to the overall sample. There is also benchmarking in the (lagged) US prime rate-
federal funds rate spread in the Hong Kong destination. Cross-listing in Hong Kong 
commands a large and significant discount between 44%-60%, a result shared by Bianconi 
and Chen (2009). In Table 2, we note that the great majority of firms that cross list in Hong 
Kong are from China, followed by few firms from Japan and Singapore and one from 
Ireland. The discount in our 2000-2005 sample is occurring predominantly for Chinese 
firms that cross-list in Hong Kong indicating that during that period the market perceived 
those firms to be less valuable.   
                                                 
 
18 All dynamic panels in Table 6 required two lags of the dependent variable to account for 
autocorrelation of the errors. 
 
19 To our knowledge, this is the first paper that estimates nominal risk factors and cross-listing 





In the Germany destination, the results are consistent with the overall sample. 
The US fed funds risk benchmarking is occurring significantly with magnitudes similar to 
the overall sample and but there isn’t benchmarking in the (lagged) US prime rate-federal 
funds rate spread in the Germany destination. Cross-listing in Germany commands a 
significant premium between 11%-16%. Given that most firms that cross-list in Germany 
are from Asia and Europe (see Table 2), and corporate governance in Germany is less 
stringent than the US, and that the costs to cross list in Germany are much smaller relative 
to the US, we infer that one potential important reason for a premium in the Germany 
destination is the signaling effect of a firm’s potential earnings. The market perceived those 
firms as more valuable.     
 Overall in Table 6, we find consistent and robust evidence that the US federal 
funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (in the Sharpe sense) risk factor provides an important 
benchmark for firm value across the universe of publicly traded companies. The local 
source nation interest rate spread is not significant in all cases; and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
dummy as well.  
In Table 7, we consider sub-samples by firm size according to total assets: (i) 
Less than US$20 million; (ii) Between US$20 and US$100 million; (iii) Greater than 
US$100 million (all in 2005 US dollars). The table shows the general case with all available 
controls. Columns (1)-(2) show the sub-sample of total assets less than US$20 million, say 
small firms. The panel fixed effects case does identify the US federal funds rate signal-to-
noise ratio effect between -5.6% and the dynamic panel of the order of -4.1%. The US 
spread and the local spreads are insignificant. The cross-listing effect is significant ranging 
from 52% to 187%. The interaction term between cross-listing and the US federal funds rate 
signal-to-noise ratio is significant. The value of a small firm that is cross-listed is much 
more sensitive to the US fed funds rate risk factor than one that is not cross-listed, an order 
of magnitude of -29.2% on average in the panel case only.  
Columns (3)-(4) show the sub-sample of total assets more than US$20 million 
and less than US$100 million, the medium sized firms. The panel fixed effects case 
identifies the contemporaneous US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio of about -2.1% 
and the dynamic panel of the order of -2.6%; much smaller than the effect for small firms. 





In columns (5)-(6), the sub-sample of total assets more than US$100 million or 
large firms, the contemporaneous US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio of about -1.9% 
and the dynamic panel of the order of -2.2%, close to the effect on the medium sized firms. 
The cross-listing effect is significant ranging from 16.4% to 27.6%. The interaction term 
between cross-listing and the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio is also significant in 
this case. The value of a large firm that is cross-listed is more sensitive to the US fed funds 
rate risk factor than one that is not cross-listed, an order of magnitude of -1.6% to -2.5% on 
average in the panel and dynamic panel cases. 
From a perspective of size, the contemporaneous effect of the U.S. federal funds 
rate signal-to-noise ratio and the cross-listing premium are larger in magnitude for smaller 
firms with total assets less than US$20 million in the sample. In addition, smaller firms that 
cross-list are likely more sensitive to the US fed funds risk factor. For the larger firms, those 
results are qualitatively similar but with a lower order of magnitude. While the medium 
sized firms show effects of the US fed funds rate risk factor similar to the large firms in 
magnitude, we do not find a significant cross-listing premium for this set of firms. Our main 
finding here is that smaller firms, and larger firms to a lower order of magnitude tend to be 
more sensitive to the US fed funds rate risk factor; and the ones that are cross-listed are 
even more sensitive to the US risk benchmark. Medium sized firms do not share this 
evidence in this sample and period. 
5.2 Treatment Effects 
We can think of firms that cross list as the ones that receive a treatment relative to the ones 
that do not cross list. Of course, it is possible that firms with higher market valuation self-
select into cross-listing. Firms with higher market value may gain more benefits from cross-
listing than the costs borne onto them through the added disclosure requirements. Local and 
US interest rate spreads and US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio may affect the 
decision of firms to cross list abroad. Lower liquidity in domestic markets may lead firms to 
seek funds abroad through cross listing. In addition, Table 2 shows that geography may 
matter for the decision to cross list and where to cross list. We apply treatment effect 





two methods for treatment effects, the consistent two-step estimator and the propensity 
score method.
20 In both cases, the models consist of the following two equations: 
 crossit = β0 + β1 dep_mktct + β2 dep_mktct-1 + β3 prime_fedUS, t + β4 prime_fedUS, t-1 +  
β5 fed_mcvUS, t + β6 fed_mcvUS, t-1
 + β' X”it + uit     (4a)  
 Log  qit = β0 + β7 dep_mktct + β8 prime_fedUS, t + β9  fed_mcvUS, t  +  ' Zit + εit   (4b) 
where (4a) is the decision on the unobserved latent variable and (4b) is the valuation 
equation; X” and Z are controls. In the two-step case, the valuation equation includes  
which measures the extent and direction in which unobserved factors that make cross-listing 
more likely to occur are associated with valuations. In the propensity score method, we 
estimate the decision equation using the balanced panel and use the predicted propensity to 
cross-list as an instrument for cross-listing in the valuation equation. Identification is 
through lagged local and US interest rate spreads and lagged US federal funds rate signal-
to-noise ratio.  
Table 8 present the results for the general case. Columns (1)-(2) give the two-step 
method and (3)-(4) the propensity score method. In the two-step method, the decision 
equation in column (1) shows that the contemporaneous and lagged US prime rate-federal 
funds rate spread and the contemporaneous and lagged US federal funds rate signal-to-noise 
ratio are significant in determining a firm’s decision to cross-list abroad; but the local 
interest spread does not influence the probability of cross-listing. In both cases, the 
contemporaneous effect increases the probability to cross-list while the lagged effect is 
negative. In addition, geographic location does matter for the decision to cross-list. Firms 
located in Asia and Europe are more likely to cross-list relative to firms from other regions. 
Column (2) shows the valuation equation where the US risk factors results are consistent 
with previous findings. The US prime-federal funds rate spread and federal funds rate 
signal-to-noise ratio is negative and significant, but the local interest spread is not 
significant. The cross-listing premium is not identified, but the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a 
significant negative effect on firm value in this case. The coefficient on  is positive and 
significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to an increase in the probability of cross-
listings when firm valuations are high. 
                                                 





Columns (3)-(4) present the propensity score method. In column (3), the decision 
equation does not include controls, except for region controls.
21 We notice that the lagged 
local interest spread negatively and significantly affects the probability of cross-listing. The 
geographic location does matter for the decision to cross-list and firms located in Asia, 
Europe and South America are more likely to cross-list relative to firms from other regions. 
In the valuation equation, column (4), the US prime rate and the US fed funds risk factors 
have negative and significant effects on firm value. The cross-listing premium is significant 
and firms that cross-list are more sensitive to the US fed funds risk factor.    
The evidence from treatment effects for the general case in Table 7 is that the 
robust effect on the probability of cross-listing is geography. Countries in Asia, Europe and 
South America tend to seek more funds abroad through cross-listing relative to other 
regions in this sample.  
Tables 9.1-9.3 present the results by destination. In the US destination sample, 
Table 9.1, there is a significant contemporaneous positive US prime risk factor effect on the 
probability of cross-listing in column (1), and a significant geographic effect from countries 
located in Asia. Column (2) shows a significant contemporaneous and negative US prime 
rate and US fed funds risk factors on the value of firms. The cross-listing premium is large 
and significant and the Sox effect is negative and significant as expected. The coefficient on 
 is negative and significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to an increase in the 
probability of cross-listings when firm valuations are low in this case.
22 
Columns (3) and (4) show the propensity score method.  In column (3), there is a 
significant contemporaneous local interest spread negative effect on the probability of 
cross-listing, a significant (lagged) US fed funds risk factor, and a significant geographic 
effect from countries located in Europe and South America. Column (4) shows a significant 
contemporaneous and negative US prime rate and US fed funds risk factors on the value of 
firms. The cross-listing premium is large and significant, firms that cross-list are more 
sensitive to the US fed funds risk factor, and the Sox effect is negative and significant as 
expected. 
                                                 
21 This is a population averaged panel probit model where latent heterogeneity has been averaged out; 
models with controls did not converge. 
 





In the HK destination sample, Table 9.2 column (1) shows significant negative 
contemporaneous and lagged local interest spreads effects on the probability of cross-listing, 
as well as a significant positive contemporaneous US fed funds risk factor. This is some 
evidence of the potential risk arbitrage of local firms when deciding to cross-list abroad. 
The geographic effect of Asia is predominant in the firm’s decision to cross-list in this case.  
In column (2), there is a significant cross-listing discount in column consistent with other 
findings above and the findings of Bianconi and Chen (2009). Column (2) also shows 
robust contemporaneous and negative US prime rate-federal funds rate spread and US 
federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio benchmarking on the value of firms. The Sox effect 
is negative as in Bianconi and Chen (2009) indicating contagion effects of the Sarbanes-
Oxley legislation abroad. The coefficient on  is positive and marginally significant 
indicating that unobserved factors lead to an increase in the probability of cross-listings 
when firm valuations are high in this case.  
Columns (3) and (4) present the propensity score method for Hong Kong. In 
column (3) the fit of the decision equation is very good. All risk factors are significant and 
we find good evidence of risk arbitrage of local firms when deciding to cross-list abroad. 
The Asia effect continues to be positive, large and significant. Column (4) shows robust 
contemporaneous and negative US prime rate-federal funds rate spread and US federal 
funds rate signal-to-noise ratio on the value of firms; the Sox effect is negative, and there is 
significant cross-listing discount.   
Finally, Table 9.3 presents the Germany destination sample. Column (1) shows a 
significant contemporaneous positive US prime risk factor effect on the probability of cross-
listing and a significant geographic effect from countries located in Europe as expected. 
Column (2) shows a significant negative US prime rate and US fed funds risk factors on the 
value of firms. The cross-listing premium is negative and significant, and the Sox effect is 
negative and significant, see e.g. Bianconi and Chen (2009). The coefficient on  is positive 
and significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to an increase in the probability of 
cross-listings when firm valuations are high in this case. 
Columns (3) and (4) show the propensity score method.  In column (3), there is a 
significant positive contemporaneous local interest spread and a significant negative lagged 





from countries located in Asia, Africa and Europe. Column (4) shows a negative and 
significant US prime rate and US fed funds risk factors on the value of firms. The cross-
listing premium is not significant, the Sox effect is negative and significant as in Bianconi 
and Chen (2009).  
The evidence from the destination samples is that geography has a positive and 
robust effect on the probability of cross listing for all destinations. The Hong Kong 
destination sample shows a robust risk arbitrage effect on the probability of cross listing 
abroad. The evidence of US risk factors benchmarking on the probability of cross listing by 
destination is not robust across destinations and methods. However, the cross-listing 
premium on firm valuation is significant and robust for the US destination, consistent with 
previous findings of Doidge et al (2004, 2009), Bianconi and Tan (2010).   
5.3 Size Effects 
Tables 10.1-10.2 show the treatment effects by firm size. Table 10.1 is the two-
step method and 10.2 is the propensity score method.  
In Table 10.1, columns (1)-(2) show the sample of total assets less than US$20 
million, the small frms. In the two-step method, the decision equation in column (1) shows 
effects of the probability of cross-listing for small firms. We note a significant local interest 
spread effect both contemporaneously positive and lagged negative; the US prime spread is 
significant and contemporaneously positive and lagged negative; and the lagged US fed 
funds risk factor effect is negative and significant. The Asia region has a significant and 
positive effect; and the Sarbanes-Oxley variable has also a positive and significant effect.
23 
The effect on the valuation in column (2) is mixed. The US spread is negative but the 
signal-to-noise ratio of the US federal funds rate is positive on valuation in this sample. The 
cross listing premium and the Sox effect are both negative on valuation.  
For the medium sized firms, column (3) shows significant monetary risk factors 
effects, positive region effects from Europe, and positive Sox effects on the probability of 
cross-listing. The local spread effect is negative both contemporaneously and lagged while 
the US risk factors are contemporaneously positive and lagged negative. The valuation 
                                                 
23 The positive effect of the Sox variable on the probability of cross-listing can be attributed to a 
crowding-in of firms willingness to cross-list when standards are raised, see Bianconi and Chen (2009) 





equation in column (4) only identifies negative US fed funds risk effects on for medium 
sized firms.      
For large firms, column (5) shows significant monetary risk factors effects, 
positive region effects from Asia, Africa, Europe, South America and Oceania; and positive 
Sox effects on the probability of cross-listing. The local spread effect is negative both 
contemporaneously and lagged, while the US risk factors are lagged positive, and the US 
fed funds risk factor is contemporaneously negative. The valuation equation in column (6) 
identifies negative US prime and fed funds risk effects on large firm value, negative local 
interest risk factor and negative Sox effects. There is a positive and significant cross-listing 
premium in this case and  is negative and significant indicating that unobserved factors 
lead to an increase in the probability of cross-listings when firm valuations are low in this 
case. 
In Table 10.2 shows the propensity score method by size. Columns (1)-(2) show 
the sample of total assets less than US$20 million, the small firms. The decision equation in 
column (1) shows effects on the probability of cross-listing for small firms. We note a 
significant negative lagged local interest spread effect; and the Asia region has a significant 
and positive effect. The effect on the valuation in column (2) is null.  
For the medium sized firms, column (3) shows only a significant lagged local 
interest spread and a positive region effect from Europe. The valuation equation in column 
(4) identifies a negative US prime spread effect, a negative US fed funds risk effect and a 
positive cross listing premium on valuation for medium sized firms.      
For large firms, column (5) shows significant local spread effect, negative both 
contemporaneously and lagged on the probability of cross listing. The US prime risk factor 
has a positive contemporaneous effect. The positive region effects are from Asia, Europe, 
and South America. The valuation equation in column (6) identifies negative US prime and 
fed funds risk effects on large firm value only. 
In summary, partitioning the sample by size identifies more significantly effects 
of local interest spread effects on the probability of cross listing across all sizes; in 
particular the lagged effects of the local interest spread is negative and robust across all 
sizes and methods. This indicates that in general, if local spreads were lower in the past the 





intuitively. However, it is surprising that the evidence is robust for all sizes though. The 
geography effects remain positive and robust for all sizes and methods. Small firms located 
in Asia show a higher probability of cross listing abroad, while medium firms located in 
Europe show a higher relative probability of cross listing abroad. Large firms in Asia, 
Europe and South America show a higher relative probability of cross listing abroad.   
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
We provide evidence of nominal effects on firm value and cross-listing decisions worldwide 
using dynamic panel data methods and treatment effects methods. We presented empirical 
models using a sample of 29 countries where firms cross-listed in a major North-American, 
Asian and European market for the period 2000-2005.  
We found that local nominal interest rates have a positive contemporaneous 
effect on firm value with evidence is in favor of a positive relationship between firm value 
and nominal interest rate consistent with the supply side effect that higher nominal interest 
rates can lead to higher real interest rates and higher capital supply via firm’s market 
valuation. However, when adding risk factors such as measures of local spreads and US 
federal funds spread and signal-to-noise ratio, the level effects become irrelevant.  
Our results on the value of firms are as follows. In Table 6, we find consistent 
and robust evidence that the US federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio (in the Sharpe sense) 
risk factor provides an important benchmark for firm value across the universe of publicly 
traded companies. However, the local source nation interest rate spread is not significant in 
all cases. The cross listing premium is significant and robust in general and for the US and 
Germany destinations, but negative for the Hong Kong destination. 
From a perspective of size, our evidence on firm value show that the 
contemporaneous effect of the U.S. federal funds rate signal-to-noise ratio and the cross-
listing premium are larger in magnitude for smaller firms with total assets less than US$20 
million in the sample. In addition, smaller firms that cross-list are more sensitive to the US 
fed funds risk factor. For the larger firms, those results are qualitatively similar but with a 
lower order of magnitude. While the medium sized firms are sensitive to the US fed funds 
rate risk factor in a similar fashion as large firms in magnitude, we do not find a significant 





larger firms to a lower order of magnitude, tend to be more sensitive to the US fed funds 
rate risk factor and the ones that are cross-listed are even more sensitive to the US fed funds 
risk benchmark. 
Our evidence on the determinants of cross listing from treatment effects shows 
geography playing a significant role. In Table 8, countries in Asia, Europe and South 
America tend to seek more funds abroad through cross-listing relative to other regions in 
this sample. Also, in Table 8 we find evidence that countries that cross list tend to be more 
sensitive to the US fed funds risk factor. The evidence from the destination samples is that 
geography has a positive and robust effect on the probability of cross listing for all 
destinations. The Hong Kong destination sample shows a robust risk arbitrage effect on the 
probability of cross listing abroad. The evidence of US risk factors benchmarking on the 
probability of cross listing by destination is not robust across destinations and methods. 
However, the cross-listing premium on firm valuation is significant and robust for the US 
destination, consistent with previous findings of Doidge et al (2004, 2009), Bianconi and 
Tan (2010). And countries that cross list in the US tend to be more sensitive to the US fed 
funds risk factor. 
The treatment evidence by size identifies more significantly effects of local 
interest spread effects on the probability of cross listing across all sizes; in particular the 
lagged effects of the local interest spread is negative and robust across all sizes and methods. 
This indicates that in general, if local spreads were lower in the past, the probability of 
seeking cross-listing in the current period is low, as we would expect intuitively. However, 
it is surprising that the evidence is robust for all sizes. The geography effects remain 
positive and robust for all sizes and methods. Small firms located in Asia show a higher 
probability of cross listing abroad, while medium firms located in Europe show a higher 
relative probability of cross listing abroad. Large firms in Asia, Europe and South America 
show a higher relative probability of cross listing abroad. 
The small time and large cross-sectional dimensions make the Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel methodology appropriate. On the other hand, we only included country and 
industry-level effects, but not firm level characteristics. A fruitful avenue for future research 
would be to expand the number of firms and origin and destination markets to better 
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Table 1: Top 10 exchanges by total share trading value 
  ___________________________________________________________________ 
Exchange  USD Bn 2006  USD Bn 2005  % change in 
USD 




21,790 17,858  22.0  22.0 
2. NASDAQ 
 




7,572 5,678  33.4  30.5 
4. Tokio Stock 
Exchange 
5,823 4,482  29.9  36.4 
5. Euronext 
 
3,853 2,906  32.6  29.2 
6. Deutche 
Burse 




1,934 1,566  23.5  21.0 
8. Borsa 
Italiana 
1,592 1,294  23.0  20.5 
9. SWX Swiss 
Exchange 
1,396 974  43.5 43.2 
10. Korea 
Exchange 
1,342 1,211  10.9  3.2 
  ____________________________________________________________________ 
 








Table 2: Countries of Origin in the Sample 





















CHINA 372  62  69 3  65  1  Asia 
ISRAEL 126  21  29 22  --  7  Asia 
INDIA 12  2  4 4  --  --  Asia 
             
JAPAN 5,790  965  222 78 4  140  Asia 
KOREA 648  108  1 1  --  --  Asia 
SINGAPORE 480  80  11 1 5  5  Asia 
PHILLIPINES 126  21  1 1  --  --     
             
SOUTH AFRICA  378  63  9 5  --  4  Africa 
             
GREECE 426  71  3 1  --  2  Europe 
NETHERLANDS 360 60  69 23  --  46  Europe 
ITALY 270  45  33 8  --  25  Europe 
SWITZERLAND 204 34  35 14  --  21  Europe 
BELGIUM 180  30  10 --  --  10  Europe 
SPAIN 126  21  12 2  --  10  Europe 
PORTUGAL 108  18  3 --  --  3  Europe 
HUNGARY 42  7  6 1  --  5  Europe 
             
UNITED KINGDOM  3,030  505  138 118 --  20  Europe 
FRANCE 870  145  37 19  --  18  Europe 
SWEEDEN 480  80  15 11  --  4  Europe 
FINLAND 336  56  13 9  --  4  Europe 
DENMARK 306  51  2 2  --  --  Europe 
IRELAND 138  23  15 14 1  --  Europe 
             
MEXICO 198  33  13  13  --  --  N.  America 
             
CHILE 192  32  15  15  --  --  S.  America 
ARGENTINA 78  13  4  4  --  --  S.  America 
VENEZUELA 24  4  2 2  --  --  S.  America 
BRAZIL 6  1  --  --  --  --  S.  America 
             
AUSTRALIA 444  74  6 5  --  1  Oceania 
NEW ZEALAND  126  21  4 4  --  --  Oceania 















Table 3: Variables Definition 
q 
 
The sum of firm's book value of total liability and its market 
capitalization divided by the firm's book value of total assets.
dep_mkt   Local interest rate spread: deposit rate - money market rate
prime_fed   US interest spread: prime rate - federal funds rate
fed_mcv 
 







Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in either the US, HK, or Germany 
and 0 otherwise 
HK  Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in HK and 0 otherwise
US  Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in US and 0 otherwise
Germany  Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in Germany and 0 otherwise
Sox 
 
Takes the value of 0 if firm is not listed before the imposition of Sox in 
2002
GDPG  GDP growth rate of the source country per year
TWENTY 
 


















Table 4: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
tq    15876 1.709465 2.440469 0.251 39.811
logtobinq    15876 0.253222 0.610933 -1.3823 3.684143
dep_mkt   15876  -0.77121  1.469323 -8.74 9.01
prime_fed   15876  2.995  0.018028 2.97 3.03
fed_mcv   15876  7.7  4.686678 3.01 16.43
cross    15876 0.049194 0.216279 0 1
us    15876 0.023936 0.152853 0 1
hk    15876 0.004724 0.068572 0 1
germany  15876 0.020534 0.141823 0 1
sox   15876  0.67939  0.466726 0 1
twenty  15876 0.874087 0.331762 0 1
hundred  15876 0.628685 0.483172 0 1






Table 5: Correlation matrix (p-value Ho: r=0) 
 
 logtob~q  dep_mkt  prime_~d  Fedmcv  cross1  us  hk1  germany1  sox  twenty  hundred 
depmkt  -0.1536 1              
  0                
prime_f
ed  -0.041  -0.0842  1            
  0 0              
fedmcv  -0.015 -0.0712  -0.2318  1             
  0.058 0  0            
cross  0.0392 -0.0329  0.0271 0.0301  1           
  0 0  0.0006  0.0002           
us  0.0512 -0.0711  0.0174 0.0347 0.6885  1         
  0  0  0.0286 0 0           
hk  -0.0293 -0.0041  0.0217 0.0062 0.3029  -0.0108  1        
  0.0002 0.6021  0.0064  0.4368  0 0.174         
german
y  0.0188  0.0285  0.0121 0.0055 0.6366  -0.0227  -0.01 1       
  0.0176 0.0003  0.1283 0.488  0  0.0043 0.2088        
sox  -0.0403 0.0966  -0.572  -0.2943 0.072  0.1076 0.0217 -0.0166  1     
  0  0  0 0 0 0  0.0062 0.0361       
twenty  -0.223  0.2137  0.0331 0.0211 0.0714 0.0545  0.0234 0.0389  -0.0777  1   
  0  0  0  0.0078 0 0  0.0032 0  0     
hundred  -0.2127  0.2221  0.0353 0.0348 0.1296 0.0931  0.0358 0.08  -0.0958  0.4939 1 
  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0   
gdpg  0.1021 -0.0343  -0.2665 0.1616 0.0167  -0.0051  0.162 -0.0473  -0.0223  -0.048  -0.1101 






















Table 6 – General Models and By Destination 
 
  Dependent   Variable:    log q            
     By 
Destination 
        























































































































































Size y  Y  y  y  y  y  y  y 
Industry y  --  y -- y y y y 
GDP Growth  y  Y  y  y  y  y  y  y 



























583.7*** 1.15***  541.8***  1.14***  1,112*** 1.15***  1,155*** 
AR(2,3) 
error z 




-- 9.89  --  9.71  --  11.26  --  12.03 
Clusters 
(by Firm) 



























Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry=SIC Code dummies; Growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP; 
time trend.  *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 






Table 7 – General Models by Size 
 
  Dependent Variable: Log q   























































































































Industry y  --  y  --  y -- 
GDP Growth  y  Y  y  y  y  y 




































-- 13.87 --  20.27* 
Clusters 
(By Firm) 
















Notes: TA=Total Assets 
Controls: Industry=SIC Code dummy; Growth of GDP,  lagged growth of GDP;  







Table 8: Treatment Effects: General Case 




















































































Cross-List ¥  
US fed_mcv 
-- --  --  -0.307*** 
(0.093) 
















South America  --  --  0.684*** 
(0.157) 
-- 
Size --  y  --  y 
Industry Y  y  --  y 
GDP Growth  --  y  --  y 
Trend --  y  --  y 
Country Y  y  --  -- 
Constant Y  y  --  y 




2 6,431***  --  122.6***  1.16*** 
R
2 (overall)  -- --  --  0.16 
Clusters (By Firm)  --  --  2,646  2,646 
Obs 13,230  13,230  15,876  13,230 
Notes: Controls: Industry=SIC Code dummy; Growth of GDP,  








Table 9.1: Treatment Effects: By Destination 
____________________________________________________________________________ 



















































































Cross-List ¥ US 
fed_mcv 
-- --  --  -0.721*** 
(0.131) 








-- --  -- 
Europe --  --  0.200*** 
(0.056) 
-- 
South America  --  --  0.674*** 
(0.147) 
-- 
Size --  y  --  y 
Industry Y  y  --  y 
GDP Growth  --  y  --  y 
Trend --  y -- y 
Country Y  y  --  -- 
Constant Y  --  y  y 




2 6,060***  --  138.2***  1.18*** 
R
2 (overall)  -- --  --  0.15 
Clusters 
(By Firm) 
-- --  2,646  2,646 
Obs 12,900 12,900  15,475  12,900 
Notes: Controls: Industry=SIC Code dummy; Growth of GDP,  






Table 9.2: Treatment Effects: By Destination 
____________________________________________________________________________ 



















































































Cross-List ¥ US 
fed_mcv 
-- --  --  0.238 
(0.085) 











Size --  y  --  y 
Industry Y  y  --  y 
GDP Growth  --  y  --  y 
Trend --  y -- y 
Country Y  y  --  -- 
Constant Y  --  y  y 




2 5,903***  --  190.2***  1.15*** 
R
2 (overall)  -- --  --  0.16 
Clusters 
(By Firm) 
-- --  2,646  2,646 
Obs 12,688  12,688  15,170  12,688 
Notes: Controls: Industry=SIC Code dummy; Growth of GDP,  









Table 9.3: Treatment Effects: By Destination 
____________________________________________________________________________ 



















































































Cross-List ¥ US 
fed_mcv 
-- --  --  0.154 
(0.125) 






Asia -- --  1.591*** 
(0.439) 
-- 








Size --  y --  y 
Industry Y  y  -- y 
GDP Growth  --  y  --  y 
Trend --  y --  y 
Country Y  y  --  -- 
Constant Y  y  y y 




2 6,401***  --  128.5***  1.15*** 
R
2 (overall)  -- --  --  0.16 
Clusters 
(By Firm) 
-- --  2,646  2,646 
Obs 12,894  12,894  15,421  12,894 
Notes: Controls: Industry=SIC Code dummy; Growth of GDP,  






Table 10.1: Treatment Effects: By Size  
      ____________________________________________________________________________ 
   Two Step Case 
 (1) 







































































































































-- -- --  1.039*** 
(0.246) 
-- 
Africa --  --  --  --  0.950*** 
(0.308) 
-- 





South America  --  --  --  --  1.320*** 
(0.284) 
-- 
Oceania --  -- -- --  0.675* 
(0.303) 
-- 
Industry --  -- -- --  --  -- 
GDP Growth  y  Y  y  y  y  y 
Trend --  Y  --  y --  y 
Country --  -- -- --  --  -- 
Constant y  --  y --  y  -- 







2 1,082***  --  932.1***  --  1,543***  -- 
Obs 1,784  1,784  3,367  3,369  8,079  8,079 
Notes: Controls: Industry=SIC Code dummy; Growth of GDP,  





Table 10.2: Treatment Effects: By Size  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
   Propensity Score – Panel FE 
 (1) 























































































































































-- -- --  0.291* 
(0.142) 
-- 





South America  --  --  --  --  0.613*** 
(0.172) 
-- 
Industry --  Y --  y --  y 
GDP Growth  --  Y  --  y  --  y 
Trend --  Y  --  y  --  y 
Constant y  Y  y y  y  y 
F--
2 60.60***  1.08  28.74***  1.21***  167.9***  1.27*** 
R
2 (overall)  -- 0.13  --  0.08  --  0.12 
Clusters 
(By Firm) 
1,150 1,098  2,061  1,949  2,605  2,553 
Obs 1,999  1,784  3,896  3,367  9,981  8,079 
Notes: Controls: Industry=SIC Code dummy; Growth of GDP,  
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FFR-AVG FFR-STD Fedm(cv)
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q - Cross-listed sample q - Non Cross-listed sample
Fig. 3: Predicted q Conditional on Interest Spreads and Fedmcv
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Fig 4: Probability of Cross-Listing Conditional on Interest Spreads and Fedcmv
 
Note: Based on probit model conditional on contemporaneous dep_mkt, prime_fed, fed_mcv. 